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Poland: The MyDr data breach and what It signals for Data Protection practice

​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​published on 18 September 2026 | reading time approx. 6 minutes​​​

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One of Poland's largest healthcare data incidents has placed processor, controller, and cybersecurity obligations back at the centre of the data protection debate. The MyDr case, a widely used medical records provider, is a timely lesson in accountability and vendor risk for any organisation that outsources data processing.


What happened​​

MyDr supplies electronic medical record (EMR) software used by an estimated 10,000–12,000 healthcare entities across Poland. In early August 2026, individuals claiming responsibility for a breach contacted a cybersecurity news outlet, asserting they had exfiltrated approximately 18.8 million unique national identification (PESEL) numbers and around 2.5 terabytes of data from MyDr's systems.


On 12 August 2026, Poland's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Affairs confirmed the scale of the incident, stating it could affect close to 19 million citizens, roughly half of Poland's population of about 37.2 million recorded by the national statistical office (GUS) in mid-2026. The exposed data reportedly includes first and last names, PESEL numbers, prescription and medication records, appointment details, and clinical notes, said to originate primarily from 2024 and earlier. MyDr confirmed it had been the target of a deliberate criminal act but, at that stage, had not confirmed the volume or categories of data affected, citing an ongoing forensic investigation.


The characterisation of the attackers is itself contested. Some early commentary framed the incident as the work of a security researcher, or so-called "white hat" hacker, seeking only to expose weaknesses in MyDr's systems. Independent analysis has pushed back, noting that a genuine responsible-disclosure test typically extracts a token proof-of-concept rather than an entire 2.5-terabyte dataset, and pointing to a password-protected "audit offer" file sent to MyDr's management, secured with the CEO's own PESEL number, plus subsequent pressure on staff and disclosures to journalists, as marks of attempted extortion rather than ethical testing. Either way, the same GDPR obligations discussed below would apply.


Current status of the case​​

The matter is proceeding on two tracks. On the criminal side, an investigation into unauthorised access to MyDr's IT systems is being conducted by the Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime, under the supervision of the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw. On the regulatory side, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (PUODO) opened an inspection of MyDr on 13 August 2026, prompted by a wave of breach notifications filed by healthcare entities that had entrusted patient data to MyDr's software.


The inspection covers three areas: the technical and organisational security measures MyDr had implemented, whether those measures were regularly tested against evolving threats, and whether MyDr's risk analysis adequately addressed the risks to the data it processed and was applied in practice. PUODO's framing of the inspection reinforces the legal architecture underpinning the case: MyDr acts as a processor, while each clinic or practice using its software remains the controller of its own patients' data.


Separately, the government made the leaked PESEL dataset searchable via the national breach-checking portal, and the Ministry of Digital Affairs has announced a package of legislative proposals in response to this incident, including certification of companies processing medical data, minimum technological requirements for IT systems used to process medical data, greater transparency toward patients, notifications regarding medical incidents and leaks of patients' personal data in government applications, and new obligations for entities that process data on a large scale.


Analysis: lessons for controllers and processors​​

The case illustrates structural risks that recur in large-scale processor incidents and that any organisation relying on external software vendors should treat as a checklist for its own exposure.


First, the controller-processor split does not shield the controller. MyDr processes data under instructions from the clinics that are its customers, but it is those clinics, as controllers under Article 4(7) GDPR, that bear primary responsibility for assessing risk to their own patients, notifying PUODO within 72 hours under Article 33 where required, and informing affected individuals under Article 34 where high risk is likely. Reliance on a vendor's reassurances does not discharge that duty, and the scale of this incident means thousands of controllers now face compliance deadlines they did not trigger themselves.


Second, processor due diligence and contractual risk allocation matter more than they are often given credit for. The adequacy of the data processing agreement between each clinic and MyDr, including the security measures it required, will shape whether a practice can defend itself before PUODO or against patient claims. Article 28 GDPR obliges controllers to use only processors offering sufficient guarantees of appropriate technical and organisational measures, and to document that assessment; integration into national e-health infrastructure is not, on its own, evidence of lower risk.


Third, sub-processing and cross-border infrastructure need active oversight. Industry reporting indicates MyDr used third-party cloud subcontractors, including major US-based providers, though this remains unconfirmed by MyDr or PUODO. If accurate, it raises Chapter V GDPR questions on international transfers and extraterritorial access, even within the EEA. Controllers should know, and be able to evidence, where their processors' sub-processors sit and what transfer safeguards apply.


Fourth, breach response speed and clarity shape both regulatory and reputational outcomes. Several days elapsed between the first signs of compromise and public confirmation of scale, during which official statements remained tentative. A tested incident response plan that fixes internal escalation, forensics, and controller notification in advance is what converts a breach into a manageable event rather than a compounding crisis.


Fifth, basic security hygiene remains decisive even in sophisticated environments. Technical safeguards under Article 32 GDPR exist precisely to address operational weaknesses, such as inadequate access control and credential management, the gaps that commonly enable large-scale compromises of this kind.


What this means for data protection trends in Poland​​

The MyDr incident is unlikely to remain isolated; it fits a pattern built over the past year. PUODO has used recent enforcement actions, including a multi-million-zloty fine against an international delivery platform for unlawful collection of identity documents, to stress that scale, duration, and data sensitivity are treated as aggravating factors in setting penalties.


The legislative response already announced, covering certification for entities processing medical data, minimum technology standards for IT systems used to process medical data, enhanced patient transparency, and new obligations for entities that process data on a large scale, signals a shift toward treating health-data processors as a distinct, higher-scrutiny category. Organisations in adjacent sectors, including insurers, pharmacies, and health-tech platforms, should expect this direction to inform future PUODO guidance and Poland's forthcoming NIS2 implementation, which is separately tightening incident-reporting timelines across many economic sectors.


For controllers, the practical takeaway is to treat vendor and processor risk management as a continuing obligation rather than a one-off contracting exercise: review processing agreements for adequacy of security commitments, confirm sub-processor and cross-border transfer arrangements are current and documented, ensure breach-notification clauses give the controller enough information quickly enough to meet its own 72-hour clock, and revisit risk assessments whenever a processor's user base or infrastructure changes. The MyDr case shows how quickly those choices, made long before any attack occurs, determine who ultimately answers to the regulator when a processor is compromised. 


Author:

Alicja Łopacińska
Attorney at Law (Poland)
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